--- /dev/null
+/*
+ Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-2001
+ Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2002
+ Copyright (C) Rafal Szczesniak 2002
+ Copyright (C) Tim Potter 2001
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+/* the Samba secrets database stores any generated, private information
+ such as the local SID and machine trust password */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#undef DBGC_CLASS
+#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_PASSDB
+
+static TDB_CONTEXT *tdb;
+
+/* Urrrg. global.... */
+BOOL global_machine_password_needs_changing;
+
+/**
+ * Use a TDB to store an incrementing random seed.
+ *
+ * Initialised to the current pid, the very first time Samba starts,
+ * and incremented by one each time it is needed.
+ *
+ * @note Not called by systems with a working /dev/urandom.
+ */
+static void get_rand_seed(int *new_seed)
+{
+ *new_seed = sys_getpid();
+ if (tdb) {
+ tdb_change_int32_atomic(tdb, "INFO/random_seed", new_seed, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/* open up the secrets database */
+BOOL secrets_init(void)
+{
+ pstring fname;
+ unsigned char dummy;
+
+ if (tdb)
+ return True;
+
+ pstrcpy(fname, lp_private_dir());
+ pstrcat(fname,"/secrets.tdb");
+
+ tdb = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+
+ if (!tdb) {
+ DEBUG(0,("Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * Set a reseed function for the crypto random generator
+ *
+ * This avoids a problem where systems without /dev/urandom
+ * could send the same challenge to multiple clients
+ */
+ set_rand_reseed_callback(get_rand_seed);
+
+ /* Ensure that the reseed is done now, while we are root, etc */
+ generate_random_buffer(&dummy, sizeof(dummy));
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/* read a entry from the secrets database - the caller must free the result
+ if size is non-null then the size of the entry is put in there
+ */
+void *secrets_fetch(const char *key, size_t *size)
+{
+ TDB_DATA dbuf;
+ secrets_init();
+ if (!tdb)
+ return NULL;
+ dbuf = tdb_fetch(tdb, string_tdb_data(key));
+ if (size)
+ *size = dbuf.dsize;
+ return dbuf.dptr;
+}
+
+/* store a secrets entry
+ */
+BOOL secrets_store(const char *key, const void *data, size_t size)
+{
+ secrets_init();
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+ return tdb_store(tdb, string_tdb_data(key), make_tdb_data(data, size),
+ TDB_REPLACE) == 0;
+}
+
+
+/* delete a secets database entry
+ */
+BOOL secrets_delete(const char *key)
+{
+ secrets_init();
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+ return tdb_delete(tdb, string_tdb_data(key)) == 0;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_sid(const char *domain, const DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+ fstring key;
+ BOOL ret;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, sid, sizeof(DOM_SID));
+
+ /* Force a re-query, in case we modified our domain */
+ if (ret)
+ reset_global_sam_sid();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_sid(const char *domain, DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+ DOM_SID *dyn_sid;
+ fstring key;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_SID, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ dyn_sid = (DOM_SID *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (dyn_sid == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(DOM_SID)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *sid = *dyn_sid;
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_sid);
+ return True;
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid)
+{
+ fstring key;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ return secrets_store(key, guid, sizeof(struct uuid));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_domain_guid(const char *domain, struct uuid *guid)
+{
+ struct uuid *dyn_guid;
+ fstring key;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ struct uuid new_guid;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMAIN_GUID, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if ((!dyn_guid) && (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC)) {
+ smb_uuid_generate_random(&new_guid);
+ if (!secrets_store_domain_guid(domain, &new_guid))
+ return False;
+ dyn_guid = (struct uuid *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (dyn_guid == NULL)
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct uuid)) {
+ DEBUG(1,("UUID size %d is wrong!\n", (int)size));
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *guid = *dyn_guid;
+ SAFE_FREE(dyn_guid);
+ return True;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching the machine trust account password
+ *
+ * @param domain domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+const char *trust_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+ static fstring keystr;
+
+ slprintf(keystr,sizeof(keystr)-1,"%s/%s",
+ SECRETS_MACHINE_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
+
+ return keystr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Form a key for fetching a trusted domain password
+ *
+ * @param domain trusted domain name
+ *
+ * @return stored password's key
+ **/
+static char *trustdom_keystr(const char *domain)
+{
+ static pstring keystr;
+
+ pstr_sprintf(keystr, "%s/%s", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS, domain);
+ strupper_m(keystr);
+
+ return keystr;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Lock the trust password entry.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_lock_trust_account_password(const char *domain, BOOL dolock)
+{
+ if (!tdb)
+ return False;
+
+ if (dolock)
+ return (tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain),0) == 0);
+ else
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, trust_keystr(domain));
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the default secure channel type for trust accounts
+************************************************************************/
+
+uint32 get_default_sec_channel(void)
+{
+ if (lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_BDC ||
+ lp_server_role() == ROLE_DOMAIN_PDC) {
+ return SEC_CHAN_BDC;
+ } else {
+ return SEC_CHAN_WKSTA;
+ }
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get the trust account password for a domain.
+ The user of this function must have locked the trust password file using
+ the above secrets_lock_trust_account_password().
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16],
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+ uint32 *channel)
+{
+ struct machine_acct_pass *pass;
+ char *plaintext;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ plaintext = secrets_fetch_machine_password(domain, pass_last_set_time,
+ channel);
+ if (plaintext) {
+ DEBUG(4,("Using cleartext machine password\n"));
+ E_md4hash(plaintext, ret_pwd);
+ SAFE_FREE(plaintext);
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ if (!(pass = secrets_fetch(trust_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (size != sizeof(*pass)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets were of incorrect size!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ if (pass_last_set_time) {
+ *pass_last_set_time = pass->mod_time;
+ }
+ memcpy(ret_pwd, pass->hash, 16);
+
+ if (channel) {
+ *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+ }
+
+ /* Test if machine password has expired and needs to be changed */
+ if (lp_machine_password_timeout()) {
+ if (pass->mod_time > 0 && time(NULL) > (pass->mod_time +
+ lp_machine_password_timeout())) {
+ global_machine_password_needs_changing = True;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(pass);
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to get account password to trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(const char *domain, char** pwd,
+ DOM_SID *sid, time_t *pass_last_set_time)
+{
+ struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ /* unpacking structures */
+ char* pass_buf;
+ int pass_len = 0;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+ /* fetching trusted domain password structure */
+ if (!(pass_buf = secrets_fetch(trustdom_keystr(domain), &size))) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_fetch failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* unpack trusted domain password */
+ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(pass_buf, size, &pass);
+ SAFE_FREE(pass_buf);
+
+ if (pass_len != size) {
+ DEBUG(5, ("Invalid secrets size. Unpacked data doesn't match trusted_dom_pass structure.\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ /* the trust's password */
+ if (pwd) {
+ *pwd = SMB_STRDUP(pass.pass);
+ if (!*pwd) {
+ return False;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* last change time */
+ if (pass_last_set_time) *pass_last_set_time = pass.mod_time;
+
+ /* domain sid */
+ if (sid != NULL) sid_copy(sid, &pass.domain_sid);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the trust account password for a domain.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trust_account_password(const char *domain, uint8 new_pwd[16])
+{
+ struct machine_acct_pass pass;
+
+ pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+ memcpy(pass.hash, new_pwd, 16);
+
+ return secrets_store(trust_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass, sizeof(pass));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Routine to store the password for trusted domain
+ *
+ * @param domain remote domain name
+ * @param pwd plain text password of trust relationship
+ * @param sid remote domain sid
+ *
+ * @return true if succeeded
+ **/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_trusted_domain_password(const char* domain, smb_ucs2_t *uni_dom_name,
+ size_t uni_name_len, const char* pwd,
+ DOM_SID sid)
+{
+ /* packing structures */
+ pstring pass_buf;
+ int pass_len = 0;
+ int pass_buf_len = sizeof(pass_buf);
+
+ struct trusted_dom_pass pass;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(pass);
+
+ /* unicode domain name and its length */
+ if (!uni_dom_name)
+ return False;
+
+ strncpy_w(pass.uni_name, uni_dom_name, sizeof(pass.uni_name) - 1);
+ pass.uni_name_len = uni_name_len;
+
+ /* last change time */
+ pass.mod_time = time(NULL);
+
+ /* password of the trust */
+ pass.pass_len = strlen(pwd);
+ fstrcpy(pass.pass, pwd);
+
+ /* domain sid */
+ sid_copy(&pass.domain_sid, &sid);
+
+ pass_len = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_pack(pass_buf, pass_buf_len, &pass);
+
+ return secrets_store(trustdom_keystr(domain), (void *)&pass_buf, pass_len);
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to set the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_machine_password(const char *pass, const char *domain, uint32 sec_channel)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ BOOL ret;
+ uint32 last_change_time;
+ uint32 sec_channel_type;
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ ret = secrets_store(key, pass, strlen(pass)+1);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ SIVAL(&last_change_time, 0, time(NULL));
+ ret = secrets_store(key, &last_change_time, sizeof(last_change_time));
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+ if (!key)
+ return False;
+ strupper_m(key);
+
+ SIVAL(&sec_channel_type, 0, sec_channel);
+ ret = secrets_store(key, &sec_channel_type, sizeof(sec_channel_type));
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to fetch the plaintext machine account password for a realm
+ the password is assumed to be a null terminated ascii string.
+************************************************************************/
+
+char *secrets_fetch_machine_password(const char *domain,
+ time_t *pass_last_set_time,
+ uint32 *channel)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ char *ret;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_PASSWORD, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ ret = (char *)secrets_fetch(key, NULL);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (pass_last_set_time) {
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 *last_set_time;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ last_set_time = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (last_set_time) {
+ *pass_last_set_time = IVAL(last_set_time,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(last_set_time);
+ } else {
+ *pass_last_set_time = 0;
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ }
+
+ if (channel) {
+ size_t size;
+ uint32 *channel_type;
+ asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_MACHINE_SEC_CHANNEL_TYPE, domain);
+ strupper_m(key);
+ channel_type = secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ if (channel_type) {
+ *channel = IVAL(channel_type,0);
+ SAFE_FREE(channel_type);
+ } else {
+ *channel = get_default_sec_channel();
+ }
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Wrapper around retrieving the trust account password
+*******************************************************************/
+
+BOOL get_trust_pw(const char *domain, uint8 ret_pwd[16], uint32 *channel)
+{
+ DOM_SID sid;
+ char *pwd;
+ time_t last_set_time;
+
+ /* if we are a DC and this is not our domain, then lookup an account
+ for the domain trust */
+
+ if ( IS_DC && !strequal(domain, lp_workgroup()) && lp_allow_trusted_domains() ) {
+ if (!secrets_fetch_trusted_domain_password(domain, &pwd, &sid,
+ &last_set_time)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("get_trust_pw: could not fetch trust "
+ "account password for trusted domain %s\n",
+ domain));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *channel = SEC_CHAN_DOMAIN;
+ E_md4hash(pwd, ret_pwd);
+ SAFE_FREE(pwd);
+
+ return True;
+ }
+
+ /* Just get the account for the requested domain. In the future this
+ * might also cover to be member of more than one domain. */
+
+ if (secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, ret_pwd,
+ &last_set_time, channel))
+ return True;
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("get_trust_pw: could not fetch trust account "
+ "password for domain %s\n", domain));
+ return False;
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the machine trust account password file for a domain.
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL trust_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+ return secrets_delete(trust_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+/************************************************************************
+ Routine to delete the password for trusted domain
+************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL trusted_domain_password_delete(const char *domain)
+{
+ return secrets_delete(trustdom_keystr(domain));
+}
+
+BOOL secrets_store_ldap_pw(const char* dn, char* pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ BOOL ret;
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, dn) < 0) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_store_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = secrets_store(key, pw, strlen(pw)+1);
+
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************
+ Find the ldap password.
+******************************************************************/
+
+BOOL fetch_ldap_pw(char **dn, char** pw)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
+
+ *dn = smb_xstrdup(lp_ldap_admin_dn());
+
+ if (asprintf(&key, "%s/%s", SECRETS_LDAP_BIND_PW, *dn) < 0) {
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: asprintf failed!\n"));
+ }
+
+ *pw=secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+ SAFE_FREE(key);
+
+ if (!size) {
+ /* Upgrade 2.2 style entry */
+ char *p;
+ char* old_style_key = SMB_STRDUP(*dn);
+ char *data;
+ fstring old_style_pw;
+
+ if (!old_style_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("fetch_ldap_pw: strdup failed!\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ for (p=old_style_key; *p; p++)
+ if (*p == ',') *p = '/';
+
+ data=secrets_fetch(old_style_key, &size);
+ if (!size && size < sizeof(old_style_pw)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: neither ldap secret retrieved!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ size = MIN(size, sizeof(fstring)-1);
+ strncpy(old_style_pw, data, size);
+ old_style_pw[size] = 0;
+
+ SAFE_FREE(data);
+
+ if (!secrets_store_ldap_pw(*dn, old_style_pw)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: ldap secret could not be upgraded!\n"));
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(*dn);
+ return False;
+ }
+ if (!secrets_delete(old_style_key)) {
+ DEBUG(0,("fetch_ldap_pw: old ldap secret could not be deleted!\n"));
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(old_style_key);
+
+ *pw = smb_xstrdup(old_style_pw);
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Get trusted domains info from secrets.tdb.
+ *
+ * The linked list is allocated on the supplied talloc context, caller gets to destroy
+ * when done.
+ *
+ * @param ctx Allocation context
+ * @param enum_ctx Starting index, eg. we can start fetching at third
+ * or sixth trusted domain entry. Zero is the first index.
+ * Value it is set to is the enum context for the next enumeration.
+ * @param num_domains Number of domain entries to fetch at one call
+ * @param domains Pointer to array of trusted domain structs to be filled up
+ *
+ * @return nt status code of rpc response
+ **/
+
+NTSTATUS secrets_get_trusted_domains(TALLOC_CTX* ctx, int* enum_ctx, unsigned int max_num_domains,
+ int *num_domains, TRUSTDOM ***domains)
+{
+ TDB_LIST_NODE *keys, *k;
+ TRUSTDOM *dom = NULL;
+ char *pattern;
+ unsigned int start_idx;
+ uint32 idx = 0;
+ size_t size = 0, packed_size = 0;
+ fstring dom_name;
+ char *packed_pass;
+ struct trusted_dom_pass *pass = TALLOC_ZERO_P(ctx, struct trusted_dom_pass);
+ NTSTATUS status;
+
+ if (!secrets_init()) return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+
+ if (!pass) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("talloc_zero failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ *num_domains = 0;
+ start_idx = *enum_ctx;
+
+ /* generate searching pattern */
+ if (!(pattern = talloc_asprintf(ctx, "%s/*", SECRETS_DOMTRUST_ACCT_PASS))) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: talloc_asprintf() failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: looking for %d domains, starting at index %d\n",
+ max_num_domains, *enum_ctx));
+
+ *domains = TALLOC_ZERO_ARRAY(ctx, TRUSTDOM *, max_num_domains);
+
+ /* fetching trusted domains' data and collecting them in a list */
+ keys = tdb_search_keys(tdb, pattern);
+
+ /*
+ * if there's no keys returned ie. no trusted domain,
+ * return "no more entries" code
+ */
+ status = NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
+
+ /* searching for keys in secrets db -- way to go ... */
+ for (k = keys; k; k = k->next) {
+ char *secrets_key;
+
+ /* important: ensure null-termination of the key string */
+ secrets_key = SMB_STRNDUP(k->node_key.dptr, k->node_key.dsize);
+ if (!secrets_key) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("strndup failed!\n"));
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ packed_pass = secrets_fetch(secrets_key, &size);
+ packed_size = tdb_trusted_dom_pass_unpack(packed_pass, size, pass);
+ /* packed representation isn't needed anymore */
+ SAFE_FREE(packed_pass);
+
+ if (size != packed_size) {
+ DEBUG(2, ("Secrets record %s is invalid!\n", secrets_key));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ pull_ucs2_fstring(dom_name, pass->uni_name);
+ DEBUG(18, ("Fetched secret record num %d.\nDomain name: %s, SID: %s\n",
+ idx, dom_name, sid_string_static(&pass->domain_sid)));
+
+ SAFE_FREE(secrets_key);
+
+ if (idx >= start_idx && idx < start_idx + max_num_domains) {
+ dom = TALLOC_ZERO_P(ctx, TRUSTDOM);
+ if (!dom) {
+ /* free returned tdb record */
+ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* copy domain sid */
+ SMB_ASSERT(sizeof(dom->sid) == sizeof(pass->domain_sid));
+ memcpy(&(dom->sid), &(pass->domain_sid), sizeof(dom->sid));
+
+ /* copy unicode domain name */
+ dom->name = TALLOC_MEMDUP(ctx, pass->uni_name,
+ (strlen_w(pass->uni_name) + 1) * sizeof(smb_ucs2_t));
+
+ (*domains)[idx - start_idx] = dom;
+
+ DEBUG(18, ("Secret record is in required range.\n \
+ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Added to returned array.\n",
+ start_idx, max_num_domains));
+
+ *enum_ctx = idx + 1;
+ (*num_domains)++;
+
+ /* set proper status code to return */
+ if (k->next) {
+ /* there are yet some entries to enumerate */
+ status = STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
+ } else {
+ /* this is the last entry in the whole enumeration */
+ status = NT_STATUS_OK;
+ }
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(18, ("Secret is outside the required range.\n \
+ start_idx = %d, max_num_domains = %d. Not added to returned array\n",
+ start_idx, max_num_domains));
+ }
+
+ idx++;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(5, ("secrets_get_trusted_domains: got %d domains\n", *num_domains));
+
+ /* free the results of searching the keys */
+ tdb_search_list_free(keys);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Lock the secrets tdb based on a string - this is used as a primitive form of mutex
+ between smbd instances.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_named_mutex(const char *name, unsigned int timeout)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!secrets_init())
+ return False;
+
+ ret = tdb_lock_bystring(tdb, name, timeout);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: got mutex for %s\n", name ));
+
+ return (ret == 0);
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Unlock a named mutex.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+void secrets_named_mutex_release(const char *name)
+{
+ tdb_unlock_bystring(tdb, name);
+ DEBUG(10,("secrets_named_mutex: released mutex for %s\n", name ));
+}
+
+/*********************************************************
+ Check to see if we must talk to the PDC to avoid sam
+ sync delays
+ ********************************************************/
+
+BOOL must_use_pdc( const char *domain )
+{
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ time_t last_change_time;
+ unsigned char passwd[16];
+
+ if ( !secrets_fetch_trust_account_password(domain, passwd, &last_change_time, NULL) )
+ return False;
+
+ /*
+ * If the time the machine password has changed
+ * was less than about 15 minutes then we need to contact
+ * the PDC only, as we cannot be sure domain replication
+ * has yet taken place. Bug found by Gerald (way to go
+ * Gerald !). JRA.
+ */
+
+ if ( now - last_change_time < SAM_SYNC_WINDOW )
+ return True;
+
+ return False;
+
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Store a complete AFS keyfile into secrets.tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_afs_keyfile(const char *cell, const struct afs_keyfile *keyfile)
+{
+ fstring key;
+
+ if ((cell == NULL) || (keyfile == NULL))
+ return False;
+
+ if (ntohl(keyfile->nkeys) > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS)
+ return False;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+ return secrets_store(key, keyfile, sizeof(struct afs_keyfile));
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ Fetch the current (highest) AFS key from secrets.tdb
+*******************************************************************************/
+BOOL secrets_fetch_afs_key(const char *cell, struct afs_key *result)
+{
+ fstring key;
+ struct afs_keyfile *keyfile;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ uint32 i;
+
+ slprintf(key, sizeof(key)-1, "%s/%s", SECRETS_AFS_KEYFILE, cell);
+
+ keyfile = (struct afs_keyfile *)secrets_fetch(key, &size);
+
+ if (keyfile == NULL)
+ return False;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(struct afs_keyfile)) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ i = ntohl(keyfile->nkeys);
+
+ if (i > SECRETS_AFS_MAXKEYS) {
+ SAFE_FREE(keyfile);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ *result = keyfile->entry[i-1];
+
+ result->kvno = ntohl(result->kvno);
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ When kerberos is not available, choose between anonymous or
+ authenticated connections.
+
+ We need to use an authenticated connection if DCs have the
+ RestrictAnonymous registry entry set > 0, or the "Additional
+ restrictions for anonymous connections" set in the win2k Local
+ Security Policy.
+
+ Caller to free() result in domain, username, password
+*******************************************************************************/
+void secrets_fetch_ipc_userpass(char **username, char **domain, char **password)
+{
+ *username = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_USER, NULL);
+ *domain = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_DOMAIN, NULL);
+ *password = secrets_fetch(SECRETS_AUTH_PASSWORD, NULL);
+
+ if (*username && **username) {
+
+ if (!*domain || !**domain)
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup(lp_workgroup());
+
+ if (!*password || !**password)
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done by user %s\\%s\n",
+ *domain, *username));
+
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(3, ("IPC$ connections done anonymously\n"));
+ *username = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *domain = smb_xstrdup("");
+ *password = smb_xstrdup("");
+ }
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ Open or create the schannel session store tdb.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+static TDB_CONTEXT *open_schannel_session_store(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
+{
+ TDB_DATA vers;
+ uint32 ver;
+ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+ char *fname = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/schannel_store.tdb", lp_private_dir());
+
+ if (!fname) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tdb_sc = tdb_open_log(fname, 0, TDB_DEFAULT, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0600);
+
+ if (!tdb_sc) {
+ DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: Failed to open %s\n", fname));
+ talloc_free(fname);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ vers = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION");
+ if (vers.dptr == NULL) {
+ /* First opener, no version. */
+ SIVAL(&ver,0,1);
+ vers.dptr = (char *)&ver;
+ vers.dsize = 4;
+ tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, "SCHANNEL_STORE_VERSION", vers, TDB_REPLACE);
+ vers.dptr = NULL;
+ } else if (vers.dsize == 4) {
+ ver = IVAL(vers.dptr,0);
+ if (ver != 1) {
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ tdb_sc = NULL;
+ DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number %d in %s\n",
+ (int)ver, fname ));
+ }
+ } else {
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ tdb_sc = NULL;
+ DEBUG(0,("open_schannel_session_store: wrong version number size %d in %s\n",
+ (int)vers.dsize, fname ));
+ }
+
+ SAFE_FREE(vers.dptr);
+ talloc_free(fname);
+
+ return tdb_sc;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ Store the schannel state after an AUTH2 call.
+ Note we must be root here.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_store_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const struct dcinfo *pdc)
+{
+ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+ TDB_DATA value;
+ BOOL ret;
+ char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
+ pdc->remote_machine);
+ if (!keystr) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ strupper_m(keystr);
+
+ /* Work out how large the record is. */
+ value.dsize = tdb_pack(NULL, 0, "dBBBBBfff",
+ pdc->sequence,
+ 8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->sess_key,
+ 16, pdc->mach_pw,
+ pdc->mach_acct,
+ pdc->remote_machine,
+ pdc->domain);
+
+ value.dptr = TALLOC(mem_ctx, value.dsize);
+ if (!value.dptr) {
+ talloc_free(keystr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ value.dsize = tdb_pack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
+ pdc->sequence,
+ 8, pdc->seed_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->clnt_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->srv_chal.data,
+ 8, pdc->sess_key,
+ 16, pdc->mach_pw,
+ pdc->mach_acct,
+ pdc->remote_machine,
+ pdc->domain);
+
+ tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
+ if (!tdb_sc) {
+ talloc_free(keystr);
+ talloc_free(value.dptr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ ret = (tdb_store_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr, value, TDB_REPLACE) == 0 ? True : False);
+
+ DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: stored schannel info with key %s\n",
+ keystr ));
+
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ talloc_free(keystr);
+ talloc_free(value.dptr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ Restore the schannel state on a client reconnect.
+ Note we must be root here.
+*******************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL secrets_restore_schannel_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ const char *remote_machine,
+ struct dcinfo *pdc)
+{
+ TDB_CONTEXT *tdb_sc = NULL;
+ TDB_DATA value;
+ unsigned char *pseed_chal = NULL;
+ unsigned char *pclnt_chal = NULL;
+ unsigned char *psrv_chal = NULL;
+ unsigned char *psess_key = NULL;
+ unsigned char *pmach_pw = NULL;
+ uint32 l1, l2, l3, l4, l5;
+ int ret;
+ char *keystr = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "%s/%s", SECRETS_SCHANNEL_STATE,
+ remote_machine);
+
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(pdc);
+
+ if (!keystr) {
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ strupper_m(keystr);
+
+ tdb_sc = open_schannel_session_store(mem_ctx);
+ if (!tdb_sc) {
+ talloc_free(keystr);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ value = tdb_fetch_bystring(tdb_sc, keystr);
+ if (!value.dptr) {
+ DEBUG(0,("secrets_restore_schannel_session_info: Failed to find entry with key %s\n",
+ keystr ));
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ tdb_close(tdb_sc);
+
+ /* Retrieve the record. */
+ ret = tdb_unpack(value.dptr, value.dsize, "dBBBBBfff",
+ &pdc->sequence,
+ &l1, &pseed_chal,
+ &l2, &pclnt_chal,
+ &l3, &psrv_chal,
+ &l4, &psess_key,
+ &l5, &pmach_pw,
+ &pdc->mach_acct,
+ &pdc->remote_machine,
+ &pdc->domain);
+
+ if (ret == -1 || l1 != 8 || l2 != 8 || l3 != 8 || l4 != 8 || l5 != 16) {
+ talloc_free(keystr);
+ SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
+ SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
+ ZERO_STRUCTP(pdc);
+ return False;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(pdc->seed_chal.data, pseed_chal, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->clnt_chal.data, pclnt_chal, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->srv_chal.data, psrv_chal, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->sess_key, psess_key, 8);
+ memcpy(pdc->mach_pw, pmach_pw, 16);
+
+ /* We know these are true so didn't bother to store them. */
+ pdc->challenge_sent = True;
+ pdc->authenticated = True;
+
+ DEBUG(3,("secrets_store_schannel_session_info: restored schannel info key %s\n",
+ keystr ));
+
+ SAFE_FREE(pseed_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(pclnt_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psrv_chal);
+ SAFE_FREE(psess_key);
+ SAFE_FREE(pmach_pw);
+
+ talloc_free(keystr);
+ SAFE_FREE(value.dptr);
+ return True;
+}
projects / samba / blobdiff