#include "eap_config.h"
#include "tls.h"
#include "eap_common/eap_tlv_common.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_peap_common.h"
+#include "tncc.h"
/* Maximum supported PEAP version
* EAP-Success and expect AS to send outer
* (unencrypted) EAP-Success after this */
int resuming; /* starting a resumed session */
+ int reauth; /* reauthentication */
u8 *key_data;
struct wpabuf *pending_phase2_req;
enum { NO_BINDING, OPTIONAL_BINDING, REQUIRE_BINDING } crypto_binding;
int crypto_binding_used;
+ u8 binding_nonce[32];
u8 ipmk[40];
u8 cmk[20];
+ int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
+ * is enabled. */
};
"receiving tunneled EAP-Success");
}
+ if (os_strstr(phase1, "crypto_binding=0")) {
+ data->crypto_binding = NO_BINDING;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Do not use cryptobinding");
+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "crypto_binding=1")) {
+ data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Optional cryptobinding");
+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "crypto_binding=2")) {
+ data->crypto_binding = REQUIRE_BINDING;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
+ }
+
+#ifdef EAP_TNC
+ if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
+ data->soh = 2;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: SoH version 2 enabled");
+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh1")) {
+ data->soh = 1;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: SoH version 1 enabled");
+ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh")) {
+ data->soh = 2;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: SoH version 2 enabled");
+ }
+#endif /* EAP_TNC */
+
return 0;
}
data->peap_version = EAP_PEAP_VERSION;
data->force_peap_version = -1;
data->peap_outer_success = 2;
- data->crypto_binding = NO_BINDING;
+ data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
if (config && config->phase1 &&
eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1) < 0) {
}
-void peap_prfplus(int version, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
- const char *label, const u8 *seed, size_t seed_len,
- u8 *buf, size_t buf_len)
-{
- unsigned char counter = 0;
- size_t pos, plen;
- u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
- size_t label_len = os_strlen(label);
- u8 extra[2];
- const unsigned char *addr[5];
- size_t len[5];
-
- addr[0] = hash;
- len[0] = 0;
- addr[1] = (unsigned char *) label;
- len[1] = label_len;
- addr[2] = seed;
- len[2] = seed_len;
-
- if (version == 0) {
- /*
- * PRF+(K, S, LEN) = T1 | T2 | ... | Tn
- * T1 = HMAC-SHA1(K, S | 0x01 | 0x00 | 0x00)
- * T2 = HMAC-SHA1(K, T1 | S | 0x02 | 0x00 | 0x00)
- * ...
- * Tn = HMAC-SHA1(K, Tn-1 | S | n | 0x00 | 0x00)
- */
-
- extra[0] = 0;
- extra[1] = 0;
-
- addr[3] = &counter;
- len[3] = 1;
- addr[4] = extra;
- len[4] = 2;
- } else {
- /*
- * PRF (K,S,LEN) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ... where:
- * T1 = HMAC-SHA1(K, S | LEN | 0x01)
- * T2 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T1 | S | LEN | 0x02)
- * T3 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T2 | S | LEN | 0x03)
- * T4 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T3 | S | LEN | 0x04)
- * ...
- */
-
- extra[0] = buf_len & 0xff;
-
- addr[3] = extra;
- len[3] = 1;
- addr[4] = &counter;
- len[4] = 1;
- }
-
- pos = 0;
- while (pos < buf_len) {
- counter++;
- plen = buf_len - pos;
- hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 5, addr, len, hash);
- if (plen >= SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
- os_memcpy(&buf[pos], hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
- pos += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
- } else {
- os_memcpy(&buf[pos], hash, plen);
- break;
- }
- len[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
- }
-}
-
-
static int eap_peap_derive_cmk(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data)
{
u8 *tk;
return -1;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: TK", tk, 60);
+ if (data->reauth &&
+ tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn)) {
+ /* Fast-connect: IPMK|CMK = TK */
+ os_memcpy(data->ipmk, tk, 40);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: IPMK from TK",
+ data->ipmk, 40);
+ os_memcpy(data->cmk, tk + 40, 20);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: CMK from TK",
+ data->cmk, 20);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (eap_peap_get_isk(sm, data, isk, sizeof(isk)) < 0)
return -1;
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: ISK", isk, sizeof(isk));
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: IMCK (IPMKj)",
imck, sizeof(imck));
- /* TODO: fast-connect: IPMK|CMK = TK */
os_memcpy(data->ipmk, imck, 40);
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: IPMK (S-IPMKj)", data->ipmk, 40);
os_memcpy(data->cmk, imck + 40, 20);
const u8 *addr[2];
size_t len[2];
u16 tlv_type;
- u8 binding_nonce[32];
-
- /* FIX: should binding_nonce be copied from request? */
- if (os_get_random(binding_nonce, 32))
- return -1;
/* Compound_MAC: HMAC-SHA1-160(cryptobinding TLV | EAP type) */
addr[0] = wpabuf_put(buf, 0);
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, data->peap_version); /* Version */
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, data->peap_version); /* RecvVersion */
wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 1); /* SubType: 0 = Request, 1 = Response */
- wpabuf_put_data(buf, binding_nonce, 32); /* Nonce */
+ wpabuf_put_data(buf, data->binding_nonce, 32); /* Nonce */
mac = wpabuf_put(buf, 20); /* Compound_MAC */
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PEAP: Compound_MAC CMK", data->cmk, 20);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PEAP: Compound_MAC data 1",
return -1;
}
pos += 4;
+ os_memcpy(data->binding_nonce, pos, 32);
pos += 32; /* Nonce */
/* Compound_MAC: HMAC-SHA1-160(cryptobinding TLV | EAP type) */
os_memcpy(buf, crypto_tlv, 60);
os_memset(buf + 4 + 4 + 32, 0, 20); /* Compound_MAC */
buf[60] = EAP_TYPE_PEAP;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Compound_MAC data",
+ buf, sizeof(buf));
hmac_sha1(data->cmk, 20, buf, sizeof(buf), mac);
if (os_memcmp(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Invalid Compound_MAC in "
"cryptobinding TLV");
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Received MAC",
+ pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Expected MAC",
+ mac, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
return -1;
}
if (result_tlv == NULL)
return -1;
force_failure = 1;
+ crypto_tlv = NULL; /* do not include Cryptobinding TLV
+ * in response, if the received
+ * cryptobinding was invalid. */
}
} else if (!crypto_tlv && data->crypto_binding == REQUIRE_BINDING) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: No cryptobinding TLV");
data->phase2_success = 1;
}
break;
+ case EAP_TYPE_EXPANDED:
+#ifdef EAP_TNC
+ if (data->soh) {
+ const u8 *epos;
+ size_t eleft;
+
+ epos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_MICROSOFT, 0x21,
+ req, &eleft);
+ if (epos) {
+ struct wpabuf *buf;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "EAP-PEAP: SoH EAP Extensions");
+ buf = tncc_process_soh_request(data->soh,
+ epos, eleft);
+ if (buf) {
+ *resp = eap_msg_alloc(
+ EAP_VENDOR_MICROSOFT, 0x21,
+ wpabuf_len(buf),
+ EAP_CODE_RESPONSE,
+ hdr->identifier);
+ if (*resp == NULL) {
+ ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE;
+ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpabuf_put_buf(*resp, buf);
+ wpabuf_free(buf);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* EAP_TNC */
+ /* fall through */
default:
if (data->phase2_type.vendor == EAP_VENDOR_IETF &&
data->phase2_type.method == EAP_TYPE_NONE) {
data->phase2_type.method);
if (data->phase2_method) {
sm->init_phase2 = 1;
- sm->mschapv2_full_key = 1;
data->phase2_priv =
data->phase2_method->init(sm);
sm->init_phase2 = 0;
- sm->mschapv2_full_key = 0;
}
}
if (data->phase2_priv == NULL || data->phase2_method == NULL) {
data->phase2_eap_success = 0;
data->phase2_eap_started = 0;
data->resuming = 1;
+ data->reauth = 1;
sm->peap_done = FALSE;
return priv;
}
if (data->crypto_binding_used) {
u8 csk[128];
+ /*
+ * Note: It looks like Microsoft implementation requires null
+ * termination for this label while the one used for deriving
+ * IPMK|CMK did not use null termination.
+ */
peap_prfplus(data->peap_version, data->ipmk, 40,
"Session Key Generating Function",
- (u8 *) "", 0, csk, sizeof(csk));
+ (u8 *) "\00", 1, csk, sizeof(csk));
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: CSK", csk, sizeof(csk));
os_memcpy(key, csk, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Derived key",
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